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Abstract
We propose a solution concept for games that are played among hyperbolic dis-
counters that are possibly naive about their own, or about their opponent’s fu-
ture time inconsistency. Our perception-perfect equilibrium essentially requires
each player to take an action consistent with the subgame perfect equilibrium,
given her perceptions concerning future types, and under the assumption that
other present and future players have the same perceptions. Applications in-
clude a common pool problem and Rubinstein bargaining. When players are
naive about their own time consistency and sophisticated about their oppo-
nent’s, the common pool problem is exacerbated, and Rubinstein bargaining
breaks down completely.
1 Introduction
Time-inconsistent present-biased preferences are among the most prominent and per-
sistent behavioral biases in economics. For example, most people would prefer to do
an unpleasant task on May 1 rather than on May 15 when faced with that choice
on April 1. But on May 1, almost everyone will be inclined to postpone it to May
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15. This type of time inconsistency (often also referred to as hyperbolic discounting)
has been put forward as an explanation of savings behavior and, more generally, to
explain why economic agents would choose to use commitment devices to restrict
their future selves.1 O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) provide a model for behavior
with such present-biased preferences. In their model, an individual decision-maker
can be time-consistent, or she can have present-biased preferences. Importantly, she
can either be sophisticated concerning her time inconsistency, or she can be naive.
A sophisticated individual knows that she will have present-based preferences in the
future, and hence will have an incentive today to restrict the choices of that future
self. If she is naive, then she believes that although her current self has present-biased
preferences, her future self will behave in a time-consistent manner.
Many situations that are of interest to economists, however, concern the interac-
tion between economic agents. Consider for example the case in which two individuals,
A and B, bargain over the distribution of some future payoff. As in the simple one-
person model. Player A’s behavior will depend on whether she is time inconsistent
and, if so, whether she is naive or sophisticated about that. However, her behavior
will also depend on whether she perceives player B to be time-consistent or not, and
whether she believes player B is naive or sophisticated. It may even depend on her
perceptions concerning player B’s perceptions about player A. Where the one-person
model implies a game played between two players (the current and future self), a
two-person model effectively implies a game played between four players (both A and
B’s current and future self).
In this paper, we study such games. We introduce an equilibrium concept for
games played between possibly time inconsistent players. As a starting point, we take
O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999). They consider a one-player game played by a current
self against her future self. In their model, players have to decide whether to do a
task now, or to do it later. The authors introduce the concept of a perception-perfect
strategy, which essentially is a course of action that maximizes the current player’s
utility given her perception about the type of her future self, and the behavior she
rationally expects from such a type. Possible types then refer to whether the future
self will be time-consistent or time-inconsistent. We first extend the analysis to one-
person games with a richer strategy space, both in the two-period case as well as in
1For a survey, see e.g. Frederick et al., 2002
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a set-up with more periods. We introduce a perception-perfect equilibrium, which is
an extension of O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999)’s perception perfect strategy, that can
also be applied to a multi-player set-up. We then analyze games with two players.
We apply our equilibrium concept to a common pool problem, and to a model of
Rubinstein bargaining.
When we allow players to have perceptions concerning the type of their competi-
tors, higher-order beliefs are going to play a crucial role. Behavior will depend not
only on player A’s perception about player B, but also on player A’s perception about
player B’s perception about player A, etcetera. To deal with this complication we im-
pose, first, that players assume that future incarnations of themselves have the same
perceptions as their current self has. We coin this intraplayer perception naivety.
Thus, if at time t = 1 player A perceives that she will be time consistent at time
t = 3, then she will also perceive that her future self at t = 2 perceives her incar-
nation at t = 3 to be time consistent. We believe this to be innocuous. In fact, the
same assumption is also implicitly made in O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999). Second,
we impose that players assume that other players have the same perceptions as they
themselves have. We coin this interplayer perception naivety. Thus, if at time t = 1
player A perceives that she will be time consistent at time t = 3, then she will also
perceive that player B perceives that A will be time consistent at time t = 3. Admit-
tedly, this assumption is somewhat stronger than intraplayer perception consistency.
Essentially, it requires that players are unable to imagine, or to think through the
implications of the possibility that the other players has different perceptions about
herself than she herself has. Yet, in our world of naive players, we feel it makes sense.
Moreover, it greatly simplifies the analysis.
Our concept of perception perfect equilibrium then entails the following. Consider
player A. She has certain perceptions about her own future type, and about the future
type of the other player. Given those perceptions, and under the assumption that all
other present and future players have the same perceptions, we can derive the subgame
perfect equilibrium that player A perceives to be played. We call this the equilibrium
as perceived by player A. Similarly, we can derive the equilibrium as perceived by
player B. The perception perfect equilibrium in period t = 1 then consists of an
action taken by player A that is consistent with an equilibrium as perceived by A,
and an action taken by player B that is consistent with an equilibrium as perceived
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by B. In all later periods the same is true, but given the actions that were played in
the past.
From our two main applications, the common pool problem and Rubinstein bar-
gaining, we derive the following insights. First, suppose that players are naive about
their own future selves, but are sophisticated about the future self of others. This is
consistent with a lot of psychological evidence, as e.g. Kahneman (2011) argues. We
then find that the common pool problem becomes much worse than in a standard
world with rational actors. This can be seen as follows. Suppose player A perceives
B to be time inconsistent in the future. That implies that B will be impatient then,
and hence claim a large share of the common pool. Given that that is the case, A has
an incentive to preempt B and claim a large share today. But the same holds for B.
As a result, both players claim a large share of the pool today, completely exhausting
it. We show that this effect is even stronger than in a case where both players know
their future selves to also be time inconsistent.
In the case of Rubinstein bargaining, we show that the assumption that players
are naive about their own future selves, but are sophisticated about the future self
of others, implies a breakdown in bargaining. Suppose that it is player A’s turn to
make an offer. She will base that offer on the assumption that B will be impatient in
the future. Yet B perceives herself to be patient in the future, and hence turns down
A’s offer. This process will continue indefinitely.
We are neither the first to develop approaches to solve games with possibly naive
hyperbolic discounters, nor are we the only scholars to solve Rubinstein bargaining
with such players. In an unpublished working paper, Sarafidis (2006) proposes “naive
backward induction” with possibly naive hyperbolic discounters. He applies the con-
cept to Rubinstein bargaining and shows that it yields similar results provided that
both players are sophisticated. His naive players are similar ours, but his sophisti-
cated players know everything, including the perceptions of the naive players. Hence
players are either naive about both players, or sophisticated about both. Akin (2007)
shows that the bargaining process breaks down if naive bargainers meet, but in his
definition of naivety players are sophisticated about the time inconsistency of their
opponents. Compared to the existing literature, our approach thus yields a frame-
work that is more consistent and more flexible concerning the types and perceptions
of players. Other related literature includes Akin (2009), in which a naive player plays
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against a sophisticated player but learns about her naivety in the course of play, and
Chade et al. (2008) who analyze repeated games between sophisticated hyperbolic
discounters.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 looks at the
case of one person. We first look at the case of a two-period model, and generalize
the equilibrium concept introduced by O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999). Section 4
further generalizes to a multi-period model, and gives examples in the context of
intertemporal consumption decisions. We then extend the analysis to a two-person
game, and introduce the concept of a perception-perfect equilibrium. We do so for
the two-period case in section 6, and apply our equilibrium concept to a common pool
problem in section 7. Section 8 looks at a multi-period model, and section 9 applies
our analysis to Rubinstein bargaining. Section 10 concludes.
2 The one-player case: two periods
In this section, we consider the simplest set-up. Suppose that one player has to make
decisions at times t = 1 and t = 2. Yet, the player may have intertemporal preferences
that are time-inconsistent. Moreover, she may not be aware that her future self (i.e.
the one that makes the decision at t = 2) may also be time-inconsistent. The problem
of the current self then is what action to take at t = 1, taking into account her
perceptions concerning the preferences of the future self.
Throughout this paper we consider the following preferences. Let ut be a per-
son’s instantaneous utility or felicity in period t. In a model with T periods, we let
Ut (ut, ut+1, . . . , uT ; β
i) represent a person’s intertemporal preferences, where βi is a
parameter. We assume
Ut
(
ut, ut+1, . . . , uT ; β
i
) ≡ ut + βi T∑
τ=t+1
δτuτ (1)
with 0 < βi, δ ≤ 1. Note that with βi = 1, equation (1) collapses into the standard
exponential discounting function with discount factor δ. With βi < 1, we have the
canonical model of hyperbolic discounting introduced by Phelps and Pollak (1968).
In that case, the person has present-biased preferences, where βi represents the bias
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for the present. In other words, she is time inconsistent.
In this context, consider a one-player game with 3 periods, t = 1, 2, 3, in which
individual A makes two sequential decisions at t = 1 and t = 2. Therefore, we refer
to this as a two-period model. In t = 1, she chooses action a1 ∈ A1, with A1 the set
of feasible actions that the current self has. In t = 2, she chooses action a2 ∈ A2(a1),
with A2(a1) the set of feasible actions available at t = 2, that may depend on a1. Her
felicity in period 1 will depend on her action in period 1; that in periods 2 and 3 will
depend on all actions. Thus uA1 = u
A
1 (a1) , while u
A
2 = u
A
2 (a1, a2) and u
A
3 = u
A
3 (a1, a2).
The present-bias of the current self (that at t = 1) is denoted βA. Following
O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999), we allow for two possibilities: she is either a hyperbolic
discounter that has βA = β, where β < 1 is some exogenously given fixed value, or
she is time-consistent and has βA = 1. For ease of discussion, we denote the true
present-bias of the future self (i.e. that at t = 2) as γA, where we also assume that
γA ∈ {β, 1}. Using (1) A’s lifetime utility at both dates is thus given by
UA1
(
a1, a2; β
A
)
= uA1 (a1) + β
AδuA2 (a1, a2) + β
Aδ2uA3 (a1, a2) (2)
UA2
(
a1, a2; γ
A
)
= uA2 (a1, a2) + γ
AδuA3 (a1, a2) (3)
where we have now written utilities as functions of actions.
Following Strotz (1956) and Pollak (1968), we allow A either to be sophisticated
(knowing exactly what her future preferences will be), or to be naive (believing that
her future biases will be identical to her current ones).2 First, suppose that βA = 1.
In that case, she must believe that γA = 1 as well. It makes no sense for the current
self to believe that she will be a hyperbolic discounter in the future if that is not
the case today. Second, suppose that βA = β. In that case, the current self is time-
inconsistent. By construction, a player that is a hyperbolic discounter will not only
be so today, but also at any point in the future. Yet, she may not be aware of that.
Naive time-inconsistent players know that they have a present-bias today, but do not
realize that they also have such a bias in the future. Such a naive player will assume
that γA = 1. Sophisticated time-inconsistent players know that they will also have a
present-bias in the future, and will assume that γA = β.
2Arguably, in reality, people are likely to be partly naive and partly sophisticated. Our set-up is
flexible enough to allow for this.
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We denote by µA (γ) the individual’s belief that she has γA = γ in the future,
with γ ∈ {β, 1} and µA (β) + µA (1) = 1. Hence, in her perception,3 µA (γ) =
Pr
(
γA = γ|βA = β) . Thus, a naive player has µA(1) = 1, a sophisticated player
µA(β) = 1. As noted, a player that has no present-bias today will also not have such
a bias in the future. Thus βA = 1 must imply µA(1) = 1.
We now introduce a formal solution concept for this game. Note that the model we
have is a generalization of O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999).4 They define a perception-
perfect strategy as one in which in all periods a person chooses the optimal action
given her current preferences and her perceptions of future behavior. Define µA as
the vector of perceptions: µA ≡ (µA (β) , µA(1)) . In our set-up, we then have the
following:
Definition 1 In the two-period one-person game, a perception-perfect strategy at t =
1 for a time-inconsistent player, given her perceptions µA, is a strategy profile (a∗1, a
∗
2)
such that
a∗2(a1;µ
A) ≡ arg max
a2∈A2(a1)
∑
γ∈{β,1}
µA (γ)UA2 (a1, a2; γ) ,∀a1 ∈ A1; (4)
a∗1(β;µ
A) = arg max
a1∈A1
UA1
(
a1, a
∗
2
(
a1;µ
A
)
; β
)
(5)
Trivially, a perception-perfect strategy for a time-consistent player is a strategy profile
(a∗1, a
∗
2) such that
a∗2 (a1; (0, 1)) = arg max
a2∈A2(a1)
UA2 (a1, a2; 1)
a∗1 (1; (0, 1)) = arg max
a1∈A1
UA1 (a1, a
∗
2 (a1; (0, 1)) ; 1)
The perception-perfect strategy for the time-inconsistent player can be understood
as follows. First, given a1, the current self assumes that the future self is going to take
3In what follows, we use “perception” rather than “belief” to clearly differentiate from most of
the literature where beliefs are rationally formed using Bayes’ rule. That is clearly not the case here.
4In that paper, a possibly time-inconsistent player has to perform an action once, and has to
choose some date in the future at which to perform that action. Yet, she has the possibility to renege
on her plan in the future. Hence, if today she plans to do it tomorrow, when tomorrow comes she
may decide to postpone the action for another day. A sophisticated player will foresee this future
tendency, but a naive player will not.
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the action that maximizes the future self’s utility. In the current self’s perception,
with probability µA(β), the future self’s utility is given by UA2 (a1, a2; β) , while with
probability µA (1) , it is given by UA2 (a1, a2; 1) . The maximizer is thus given by equa-
tion (4) and denoted a∗2(a1;µ
A). In period 1, given her perceptions, the current self’s
lifetime utility if she takes action a1 today is given by U
A
1
(
a1, a
∗
2
(
a1;µ
A
)
; β
)
. The
current self thus chooses a1 to maximize this expression, hence (5). The perception-
perfect strategy for the time-inconsistent player follows directly from backward in-
duction.
Definition 2 In the two-period one-person game, a perception-perfect equilibrium is
a strategy profile (a∗1, a
∗
2) such that a
∗
1 is part of a perception-perfect strategy at period
1, while a∗2 maximizes the future self ’s utility at t = 2, given the action a
∗
1 that was
taken in period 1.
Note therefore that there is a crucial difference between a perception-perfect strat-
egy and a perception-perfect equilibrium; a perception-perfect strategy is a strategy
profile that a player perceives to be played, while a perception-perfect equilibrium is
the strategy profile that actually will be played. There may be a difference between
the two if the player is time-inconsistent and naive. This distinction will become even
more important in the T -period case.
3 Example: intertemporal consumption, 2 periods
Consider a person that lives for 3 periods, and starts out with wealth 1 in period 1.
Instantaneous utility in each period is given by uAt (at) =
√
at, with at consumption
in period t. For simplicity, the discount factor δ equals 1. The standard model, with
time-consistent preferences, would have the person maximizing
UA1 (a1, a2) =
√
a1 +
√
a2 +
√
1− a1 − a2
which would obviously result in a∗1 = a
∗
2 = 1/3. Note that this simple decision problem
satisfies our set-up. This person has to make two decisions; the consumption deci-
sion a1 and the consumption decision a2, with A1 = [0, 1] and A2 (a1) = [0, 1− a1] .
In period 3, she consumes whatever is left of her initial wealth. Obviously, both
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the perception-perfect strategy and the perception-perfect equilibrium of a time-
consistent player would be to have a∗1 = a
∗
2 = 1/3 as well.
We now solve for the perception-perfect strategy of the time-inconsistent player.
Using (4), at t = 2, and given first-period consumption a1 and future time inconsis-
tency γ, the player will choose a2 as to maximize
UA2
(
a1, a2; γ
A
)
=
√
a2 + γ
A
√
1− a1 − a2.
This yields
a∗2
(
a1;µ
A
)
=
1− a1
1 + [βµA (β) + µA (1)]2
=
1− a1
1 + β˜2
,
where, for ease of exposition, we write
β˜ ≡ βµA (β) + µA (1) . (6)
Perceived consumption in the last period is then given by
a∗3
(
a1;µ
A
)
=
β˜2 (1− a1)
1 + β˜2
.
Plugging this back into the lifetime utility of the current self yields
UA1
(
a1, a
∗
2
(
a1;µ
A
)
; β
)
=
√
a1 + β
√
1− a1
1 + β˜2
+ β
√
β˜2 (1− a1)
1 + β˜2
=
√
a1 + β
1 + β˜√
1 + β˜2
√
1− a1
The current self thus sets
a∗1
(
β;µA
)
=
1 + β˜2
β2
(
1 + β˜
)2
+ 1 + β˜2
.
A sophisticated time-inconsistent player has µA (β) = 1 and µA (1) = 0, so β˜ = β.
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She would thus choose
a∗1 (β; (1, 0)) =
1 + β2
β2 (1 + β)2 + 1 + β2
.
and plan to have
a∗2 (a1; (1, 0)) =
1− a∗1
1 + β2
=
β2 (1 + β)2
(1 + β2) (2β2 + 2β3 + β4 + 1)
.
As the future self indeed has γA = β, the strategy profile (a∗1 (β; (1, 0)) , a
∗
2 (a1; (1, 0)))
is both the perception-perfect strategy in period 1, and the perception-perfect equi-
librium of the game.
Now consider a naive time-inconsistent player. She has µA (β) = 0 and µA (1) = 1,
so β˜ = β. Hence
a∗1 (β; (0, 1)) =
1
1 + 2β2
and she plans to have
a∗2 (a1; (0, 1)) =
1− a∗1
2
=
β2
1 + 2β2
.
In period 2, however, she will find herself with γA = β rather than γA = 1 as she
expected. Hence, true second-period consumption will be
a∗2 (a1, β) =
1− a1
1 + β2
=
1
1 + 2β2
.
Thus, in this case, a perception-perfect strategy in period 1 is to choose (a∗1, a
∗
2) =(
1
1+2β2
, β
2
1+2β2
)
, while the perception-perfect equilibrium will turn out to be (a∗1, a
∗
2) =(
1
1+2β2
, 1
1+2β2
)
. It is interesting to note that a∗1 (β; (0, 1)) < a
∗
1 (β; (1, 0)) . Hence, a
naive player will choose a lower first-period consumption than a sophisticated one.
This result is in line with O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999), who in a simpler framework
find a “sophistication effect”: when the reward of an action is immediate, naive players
suffer less from the time inconsistency problem than sophisticated players.
Obviously, in our application, the rewards from consumption are also immedi-
ate. Here, the sophistication effect can be explained as follows. Different from naive
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players, sophisticated players are pessimistic about their future selves; they know
that future selves will be impatient and squander most of their wealth quickly. As
a consequence, sophisticated agents restrict the tendency of the future self to over-
consume by increasing immediate consumption, which restricts the availability of the
resource in the future. In other words, rather than allowing future selves to squander
the wealth, current selves prefer to do this themselves. Hence, in our example, first
period consumption is higher if there is a sophistication effect. Of course, if cur-
rent selves can commit to a future consumption path, this result does not necessarily
hold. In the presence of a commitment device, sophisticated agents benefit from their
knowledge because it enables them to restrict future consumption by committing to
a certain consumption path.
4 The one-player case: T periods
We now generalize the two-period decision problem we described in Section 2, to one
with T periods. This complicates the problem. Consider the simplest case, with
T = 3. Then the decision made by our player at T = 1 will be influenced by her
perceptions concerning her type at T = 2. We will denote these perceptions as µA12,
where the first subscript reflects the time period in which perceptions are formed,
and the second superscript reflects the time period that these perceptions apply to.
But the decision made at T = 1 will also be influenced by her perceptions concerning
her type at T = 3, denoted µA13. Complicating matters further, the optimal decision
at T = 1 will be influenced by her perception of the action that the future self will
make at T = 2, which will in turn be determined by the perceptions that the future
self at T = 2 will have, or rather, the perceptions that the current self at T = 1 will
perceive that future self to have. Denote these perceptions as µA1
(
µA23
)
; these are
the perceptions that at T = 1, player A perceives her future self at T = 2 to have
concerning her type at T = 3.
To simplify matters, we make the following assumptions5
5Note that these assumptions also implicitly made by O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999). They
assume that a naive player not only beliefs that she will be time-consistent in the next period, but
also in any future period. Effectively, this is our perception consistency. Also, they implicitly rule
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Assumption 1 Perception consistency. Perceptions concerning the type of a
future self are identical for all future selves: µAij = µ
A
ik for all i < T, j, k ∈ {i +
1, . . . , T}.
Assumption 2 Intraplayer perception naivety. Perceptions of a future self are
assumed identical to perceptions of the current self: µAi (µ
A
jk) = µ
A
ik for all T ≥ k >
j > i.
Note that there is a subtle difference between these two assumptions. Perception
consistency implies that a player rules out that her type will change at some point in
the future; if she perceives herself to be time-consistent at some point in the future,
then she should perceive herself to be time-consistent at any point in the future. This
seems a natural assumption to make; it is hard to justify a case in which, say, a
player is naive concerning her future self in even periods but sophisticated concerning
herself in odd periods.6 Intraplayer perception naivety implies that a person rules
out that her future self will change her opinion about selves that are even further in
the future. Thus, we rule out that a player perceives today that her future self in
two weeks is sophisticated, but maintains the possibility that one week from now she
perceives that same future self to be naive.
Note that this also implies that we assume that a naive person will never learn
to be more sophisticated through e.g. some kind of Bayesian updating. This greatly
simplifies the analysis and seems consistent with casual observation. Still, it is feasible
to enrich our framework to allow for such learning, but we leave that for future
research.
At time t, define history Ht ≡ (a1, . . . , at−1) . Similar to (2) and (3), lifetime utility
out complications that may be caused by, say, a sophisticated player that maintains the possibility
that he may be naive in the future. This is explicitly ruled out by our intraplayer perception naivety.
6It is conceivable though that a player is sophisticated concerning the near future (say, up to
some t ≤ t∗), but naive concerning the more distant future (t > t∗). It is straightforward to extend
the analysis to allow for such a possibility. That, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.
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at time t ≤ T can then be written
UA1
(
a; βA
)
= u1(a1) + β
A
T∑
k=2
δkuAk (Hk, ak) + β
AδT+1uAt+1(Ht+1),
UAt
(
a; γA
)
= ut (Ht, at) + γ
A
T∑
k=t+1
δkuAk (Hk, ak) + γ
AδT+1uAt+1(Ht+1) ∀1 < t ≤ T,
with a the vector of all decisions: a ≡ (a1, a2, . . . , ak) , and where we allow felicity in
period T + 1 to also play a role, just as we did in the case that T = 2. Given the
assumptions above, µA now reflects the perceptions at any time t concerning the type
of the future self at any time k > t. More precisely µA(γ) = Pr
(
γA = γ|βA = β) with
γA the time inconsistency at any future period.7
Definition 3 In the T -period one-person game, a perception-perfect strategy at time
τ for a time-inconsistent player, given her perceptions µA and history Ht is a strategy
profile (a∗τ , a
∗
τ+1, . . . a
∗
T ) such that
a∗T (HT ;µ
A) = arg max
aT∈AT (HT )
∑
γ∈{β,1}
µA (γ)uAT (HT , aT ; γ) ; (7)
a∗t (Ht;µ
A) = arg max
at∈At(Ht)
∑
γ∈{β,1}
µA (γ)UAt
(
Ht, at, a
∗
t+1
(
Ht+1;µ
A
)
,
. . . , a∗T (HT ;µ
A); γ
) ∀τ < t < T ;
a∗τ (β;µ
A) = arg max
aτ∈Aτ (Hτ )
UAτ
(
Hτ , a1, a
∗
2
(
H2;µ
A
)
, . . . , a∗T (HT ;µ
A); β
)
.
Trivially, a perception-perfect strategy for a time-consistent player is a strategy profile
(a∗τ , a
∗
τ+1, . . . a
∗
T ) such that
a∗T (HT ; (0, 1)) = arg max
aT∈AT (HT )
UAT (HT ; 1)
a∗t (Ht; (0, 1)) = arg max
at∈At(Ht)
UAt
(
Ht, a
∗
t+1 (Ht+1; (0, 1)) , . . . , a
∗
T (HT ; (0, 1)); 1
)
∀τ ≤ t < T.
The perception-perfect strategy for the time-inconsistent player can be understood
7Hence, we do not need a subscript t on either γ or γA.
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much along the same lines as that for the case T = 2. We solve with backward
induction. First, given HT , the current self assumes that the future self is going to
take the action that maximizes the future self’s utility. In the current self’s perception,
with probability µA(β), the future self’s utility is given by UAT (Ht, at; β) , while with
probability µA (1) , it is given by UAT (Ht, at; 1) . The maximizer is thus given by (7)
and denoted a∗T (HT ;µ
A). In period T − 1, with probability µA(β), the future self’s
utility is given by UAT−1
(
HT−1, aT−1, a∗T
(
HT ;µ
A
)
; β
)
, with probability µA (1) , it is
given by UAT−1
(
HT−1, aT−1, a∗T
(
HT ;µ
A
)
; 1
)
. In both cases, HT = (HT−1, aT−1). For
ease of exposition, this dependence of future history on current action is not explicitly
taken into account in our notation above. Again, the current self assumes the future
self at t = T − 1 to take the action that maximizes her utility. This process unravels
until period 1, where the current self chooses the a1 that maximizes her lifetime utility
given her perceptions about future selves and given her true βA in period 1.
Definition 4 In the T -period one-person game, a perception-perfect equilibrium is a
strategy profile (a∗1, a
∗
2, . . . , a
∗
T ) such that a
∗
τ is part of a perception-perfect strategy at
time τ for all τ = 1, . . . , T.
Note again that there is a crucial difference between a perception-perfect strategy
and a perception-perfect equilibrium; a perception-perfect strategy is a strategy pro-
file that a player perceives to be played, while a perception-perfect equilibrium is the
strategy profile that actually will be played.
It is relatively straightforward to extend the analysis to a case with infinitely many
periods. Solving such a model would be similar to solving an infinite-horizon maxi-
mization problem in the case of time-consistent preferences, but under the assumption
that all future selves have the type the current self perceives them to have.
5 Example: intertemporal consumption T periods
To give a flavor of the analysis, we consider the same consumption example as above,
but now with T periods;
UA1 (a) =
√
a1 +
√
a2 + . . .
√
aT +
√√√√1− T∑
t=1
at.
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In this case, a time-consistent player would set a∗1 = . . . = a
∗
T =
1
T+1
We now solve for the perception-perfect strategy of the time-inconsistent player.
Define total consumption in the past at time τ as hτ =
∑τ−1
t=1 at. At t = T, and given
first-period consumption a1 and future time inconsistency γ, the player will choose
a2 as to maximize
UAT
(
HT , aT ; γ
A
)
=
√
aT + γ
A
√
1− hT − aT .
This yields
a∗T
(
Ht;µ
A
)
=
1− hT
1 + [βµA (β) + µA (1)]2
=
1− hT
1 + β˜2
,
where again β˜ is given by (6). Now move back to T − 1.
UAT−1
(
HT−1, aT−1, a∗T
(
Ht;µ
A
)
; γA
)
=
√
aT−1 + γA
√
1− hT−1 − aT−1
1 + β˜2
+ γA
√
1− hT−1 − aT−1 − 1− hT−1 − aT−1
1 + β˜2
Take advantage of perception consistency to note that the future self at t = T − 2 is
thus expected to maximize
UAT−1 =
√
aT−1 + β˜
√
1− hT−1 − aT−1
1 + β˜2
+ β˜
√
1− hT−1 − aT−1 − 1− hT−1 − aT−1
1 + β˜2
This yields
a∗T−1 =
1 + β˜2
β˜2
(
1 + β˜
)2
+ 1 + β˜2
(1− ht−1) .
Solving the model further is conceptually straightforward but analytically tedious.
6 Two-player case: two periods
We now come to the main aim of this paper: to extend the analysis above to a case
with multiple players. Needless to say, this will greatly complicate the analysis. The
current decisions of a player will now not only depend on her perceptions concerning
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her own future type, but also on her perceptions concerning the other player’s future
type, and possibly even about her perceptions of the other player’s perceptions, plus
how those perceptions will affect her own and the other player’s future actions.
For simplicity, we start with the case of two periods, so T = 2, and two players,
denoted A and B. For ease of exposition, in what follows we will refer to player A as
being female, and to player B as being male. Again, player i’s present-bias is denoted
βi ∈ {1, β} . The true present-bias of the future self of player i (i.e. player i’s type)
is γi ∈ {1, β} . There are 3 periods, t = 1, 2, 3. In the first two periods both A and
B make a simultaneous decision. In t = 1, player A chooses action a1 ∈ A1, while B
chooses action b1 ∈ B1 . At t = 2, players learn the actions taken at t = 1, and player
A chooses action a2 ∈ A2(a1, b1), while B chooses b2 ∈ B2(a1, b1). We now have
U i1
(
a1, b1, a2, b2; β
i
)
= ui1(a1, b1) + β
iδui2 (a1, b1, a2, b2) + β
iδ2ui3 (a1, b1, a2, b2)
U i2
(
a1, b1, a2, b2; γ
i
)
= ui2 (a1, b1, a2, b2) + γ
iδui3 (a1, b1, a2, b2) ,
i ∈ {A,B}.
In period 1, what player A expects to happen in period 2 will depend on her
perceptions concerning her own future type, and on her perceptions concerning B’s
future type. For simplicity, we will assume that players can observe each other’s
current type, so both A and B can observe βA and βB. This simplifies the exposition,
but it is conceptually straightforward to relax this assumption and also allow players
to have perceptions concerning their competitor’s current type.
A straightforward extension of the one-person case is as follows. In the perception
of person A we have µAA(γ) = PrA
(
γA = γ|βA = β) , where the first superscript
denotes perceptions held by player A, and the second denotes perceptions concerning
player A. The superscript on Pr denotes that this is the probability as perceived by
player A. Similarly, we have µAB(γ) = PrA
(
γB = γ|βB = β). Naturally, µBA(γ) =
PrB
(
γA = γ|βA = β) and µBB(γ) = PrB (γB = γ|βB = β) .
In principle we now have to be concerned about what A perceives B to perceive
about A, for example, i.e. we need to be concerned about µAB
(
µBA
)
. We also assume
naivety in this respect, in the sense that what A perceives B to perceive about A is
the same what A perceives about herself, thus µAB
(
µBA
)
= µAA. More generally,
we assume
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Assumption 3 Current interplayer perception naivety. Perceptions of the
other player are assumed identical to one’s own perceptions: µij(µjk) = µik for all
i, j, k ∈ {A,B} .
Note that this is a natural extension of the intraplayer perception naivety we
assumed in the one-person case. That assumption implies that a person rules out
that her future self will change her opinion about selves that are even further in
the future. This assumption implies that, say, player A rules out that player B has
perceptions about the future self of player A that are different from what player A
herself has. In other words, player A is so convinced about the type of her future self
that she cannot perceive that the other player has different perceptions.
Again, we solve the game using backward induction. For ease of exposition, we
restrict attention to the case where both players are time-inconsistent. Consider
player A. When deciding upon her first-period action, she again has to form some
perception as to what will happen in period 2, given the actions taken in period 1. In
the one-person case, she could simply derive the action her future self would be taking
in period 2, given her perceptions about her future self. Now the analysis becomes
more involved, as she also has to take the type and possible actions of player B into
account. Suppose that the actions taken in period 1 are (a1, b1). Given these actions,
we now look for a Nash equilibrium for the subgame at t = 2 as perceived by player
A. As an example suppose player A perceives both players to be time-consistent
in the future, so µAA(1) = µAB(1) = 1. She will then expect a Nash equilibrium
(aA2 , b
A
2 ) to be played which is such that a
A
2 maximizes her future self’s utility given
bA2 and given her perception that her future self is time-consistent, and such that b
A
2
maximizes the future self’s utility of player B, given A’s perception that B’s future
self is time-consistent. Thus
aA2 = arg max
a2
UA2
(
a1, b1, a2, b
A
2 ; 1
)
bA2 = arg max
b2
UA2
(
a1, b1, a
A
2 , b2; 1
)
where superscripts A denote the fact that we are considering the perceptions of player
A. More generally,
Definition 5 Consider the two-period two-person game played by time-inconsistent
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players. In period 2, given (a1, b1) an equilibrium as perceived by player i ∈ {A,B}
is an outcome
(
ai2(a1, b1;µ
iA), bi2(a1, b1;µ
iB)
)
that forms a Nash equilibrium of the
second-stage game, given the perceptions of player i. Hence
ai2 = arg max
a2∈A2(a1,b1)
∑
γ∈{β,1}
µiA (γ)UA2
(
a1, b1, a2, b
A
2 ; γ
)
bi2 = arg max
b2∈B2(a1,b1)
∑
γ∈{β,1}
µiB (γ)UB2
(
a1, b1, a
A
2 , b2; γ
)
Moving back to period 1, given that player A has a perception of the play that
will ensue in period 2 for any (a1, b1) in period 1, it is straightforward to write down
the conditions for a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium as perceived by player A. We
will refer to this simply as an equilibrium as perceived by player A.
Definition 6 In period 1, an equilibrium as perceived by player i is an outcome(
ai1
(
β;µiA, µiB
)
, bi1
(
β;µiA, µiB
))
that is part of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
of the entire game, given the perceptions of player i. Thus,
ai1 = arg max
a1∈A1
UA1
(
a1, b
i
1, a
i
2(a1, b
i
1;µ
iA), bi2(a1, b1;µ
iB); β
)
bi1 = arg max
b1∈B1
UB1
(
ai1, b1, a
i
2(a1, b1;µ
iA), bi2(a1, b1;µ
iB); β
)
. (8)
Using these definitions, and considering play in period 1, we thus expect player A
to take an action that she perceives to be part of a subgame perfect equilibrium for
the entire game, while we expect player B to take an action that he perceives to be
part of a subgame perfect equilibrium for the entire game.
Definition 7 A perception-perfect equilibrium of the game is an outcome (a∗1, b
∗
1, a
∗
2, b
∗
2)
such that a∗1 is part of an equilibrium as perceived by player A; b
∗
1 is part of an equi-
librium as perceived by player B; a∗2 is an equilibrium as perceived by player A given
(a∗1, b
∗
1); and b
∗
2 is an equilibrium as perceived by player B given (a
∗
1, b
∗
1).
Needless to say, the actions a∗1 and b
∗
1 do not have to be consistent with each
other, in the sense that they do not have to be part of the same equilibrium. Also,
we assume that players do not learn anything about the perceptions or type of the
other player upon observing first-period actions. Of course, we do allow a player to
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adapt her strategy in the second period upon observing the other player’s action in
period 1. In other words, we assume that, say, player A takes the action that she feels
is part of an equilibrium of the second stage based on the actions that she actually
observed to be played in period 1, rather than the actions that she expected to be
played in period 1.
It is straightforward to extend the analysis above to a case where, for example,
one player is known to be time-consistent,8 or to a case where players cannot observe
the other player’s current type.9
7 Application to the common pool problem
We consider a common pool problem similar to the example that we gave for the
one-person model. Consider two players, A and B, that live for 3 periods, and start
out with joint wealth 1. Instantaneous utility in each period is given by uit (c) =
√
c,
i ∈ {A,B} . For simplicity, the discount factor δ equals 1. In each of the 2 periods
each player takes some amount for immediate consumption out of the common pool.
Whatever is left in the last period will be equally shared among the two.
To get some feel for the problem, we first consider the case in which both players
8Suppose that player B is known to be time-consistent. In that case, his future self will necessarily
also be time-consistent, so µAB(1) = µBB(1) = 1. Moreover, the conditions (8) then modify to
ai1 = arg max
a1∈A1
UA1
(
a1, a
i
2(a1, b
i
1;µ
AA), bi1, b
i
2(a1, b1;µ
iB);β
)
bi1 = arg max
b1∈B1
UB1
(
ai1, a
i
2(a1, b1;µ
AA), b1, b
i
2(a1, b1;µ
iB); 1
)
9The conditions (8) then modify to
ai1 = arg max
a1∈A1
∑
γ∈{β,1}
µiA (γ)UA1
(
a1, a
i
2(a1, b
i
1;µ
AA), bi1, b
i
2(a1, b1;µ
iB);β
)
bi1 = arg max
b1∈B1
∑
γ∈{β,1}
µiA (γ)UB1
(
ai1, a
i
2(a1, b1;µ
AA), b1, b
i
2(a1, b1;µ
iB); 1
)
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are time-consistent. Their respective lifetime utility functions in period 1 then equal
UA1 (a1, b1, a2, b2) =
√
a1 +
√
a2 +
√
1− a1 − a2 − b1 − b2
2
(9)
UB1 (a1, b1, a2, b2) =
√
b1 +
√
b2 +
√
1− a1 − a2 − b1 − b2
2
Using backward induction, in period 2 player A will set a2 to maximize
UA2 (a1, b1, a2, b2) =
√
a2 +
√
1− a1 − a2 − b1 − b2
2
which yields the reaction function
a2 =
2
3
(W2 − b2) ,
with W2 ≡ 1 − a1 − b1 the amount of wealth left at the start of period 2. Imposing
symmetry, this yields the Nash equilibrium a∗2 = b
∗
2 =
2
5
W2. Plugging this back into
(9), maximizing with respect to a1 and imposing symmetry, we have a
∗
1 = a
∗
2 = 10/29.
Now consider the case of time-inconsistent and possibly naive players. First con-
sider the case in which both players are sophisticated with respect to both their own
future self and that of the other player. For simplicity, we set β = 1/2. At t = 1, the
current self of player A thus perceives an equilibrium in period 2 to satisfy
aA2 = arg max
√
a2 +
1
2
√
W2 − a2 − b2
2
bA2 = arg max
√
b2 +
1
2
√
W2 − a2 − b2
2
.
This yields reaction functions aA2 =
8
9
(
W2 − bA2
)
and bA2 =
8
9
(
W2 − aA2
)
so the per-
ceived equilibrium has aA2 = b
A
2 = 8W2/17. Moving back to period 1, the equilibrium
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perceived by player A should satisfy10
aA1 = arg max
a1
√
a1 +
1
2
√
8 (1− a1 − bA1 )
17
+
1
2
√
1− a1 − bA1
34
bA1 = arg max
b1
√
b1 +
1
2
√
8 (1− aA1 − b1)
17
+
1
2
√
1− aA1 − b1
34
Maximizing and solving for the equilibrium yields aA1 = b
A
1 =
136
297
≈ 0.458, so aA2 =
bA2 =
200
5049
≈ 0.0396. As player B faces the same problem and the same perceptions, he
will have the same perceived equilibrium in periods 1 and 2 as player A. Moreover,
as players’ perceptions turn out to be correct, what they perceive to be played in
period 2 is also what is actually played in period 2. Hence, the perception-perfect
equilibrium is (a∗1, a
∗
2, b
∗
1, b
∗
2) =
(
136
297
, 200
5049
, 136
297
, 200
5049
)
.
Now consider the case in which both players are naive concerning all future selves.
At t = 1, player A perceives the equilibrium in stage 2 to satisfy
aA2 = arg max
√
a2 +
√
W2 − a2 − b2
2
bA2 = arg max
√
b2 +
√
W2 − a2 − b2
2
,
which yields reaction functions aA2 =
2
3
(
W2 − bA2
)
and bA2 =
2
3
(
W2 − aA2
)
, so the
equilibrium has aA2 = b
A
2 = 2W2/5. Moving back to period 1, the equilibrium perceived
by player A should satisfy11
aA1 = arg max
a1
√
a1 +
1
2
√
2 (1− a1 − bA1 )
5
+
1
2
√
1− a1 − bA1
10
bA1 = arg max
b1
√
b1 +
1
2
√
2 (1− aA1 − b1)
5
+
1
2
√
1− aA1 − b1
10
Maximizing and solving for the equilibrium yields aA1 = b
A
1 =
40
89
≈ 0.449, so aA2 =
10After period 1, W2 is left. In period 2, player A perceives both players to consume 8W2/17,
hence in period 3 there is W2/17 left, which is equally shared among both players. Plugging in
W2 = 1− aA1 − bA1 and using 9 implies these expressions.
11After period 1, W2 is left. In period 2, player A perceives both players to consume 2W2/5,
hence in period 3 there is W2/5 left, which is equally shared among both players. Plugging in
W2 = 1− aA1 − bA1 and using 9 implies these expressions.
21
bA2 =
18
445
≈ 0.0404. As player B faces the same problem and the same perceptions, he
will have the same perceived equilibrium in periods 1 and 2 as player A. However,
players’ perceptions turn out to be incorrect: the equilibrium in the second period has
them both consuming 8W2/17 (as we saw in the previous analysis) rather than 2W2/5.
Hence, actual consumption in period 2 will turn out to be a∗2 = b
∗
2 =
72
1513
≈ 0.0476,
and the perception-perfect equilibrium is (a∗1, a
∗
2, b
∗
1, b
∗
2) =
(
40
89
, 72
1513
, 40
89
, 72
1513
)
. Just as
in the one-person case, sophisticated players strategically consume more in period 1
than naive players do.
Perhaps the most interesting case is the one in which both players perceive them-
selves to be time-consistent in the future, but perceive their competitor to be time-
inconsistent in the future. In other words, each player is naive concerning her own
future self, but sophisticated concerning the future self of the other player. As noted
in the introduction, Kahneman (2011) argues that this is the typical situation. Player
A will then perceive a second-period equilibrium
aA2 = arg max
√
a2 +
√
W2 − a2 − b2
2
bA2 = arg max
√
b2 +
1
2
√
W2 − a2 − b2
2
,
which yields reaction functions aA2 =
2
3
(
W2 − bA2
)
and bA2 =
8
9
(
W2 − aA2
)
, so aA2 =
2W2/11 and b
A
2 = 8W2/11. Thus, player A perceives to consume much less in period
2 than player B does. Note that the reaction functions are strategic substitutes, in
the sense of Bulow et al. (1985). Player A expects player B to be very aggressive in
period 2, due to A’s perception that B will be very impatient and thus claim a high
amount of then current consumption. As A (again in her perception) will be much
more patient, she will claim a very low share of the available wealth then as future
consumption is still important for her.
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Plugging this into the perceived first-period problems12
aA1 = arg max
a1
√
a1 +
1
2
√
2 (1− a1 − bA1 )
11
+
1
2
√
1− a1 − bA1
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bA1 = arg max
b1
√
b1 +
1
2
√
8 (1− aA1 − b1)
11
+
1
2
√
1− aA1 − b1
22
yielding best-reply functions aA1 =
88
97
(
1− bA1
)
and bA1 =
88
113
(
1− aA1
)
so aA1 =
2200
3217
≈
0.684 and bA1 =
792
3217
≈ 0.246. Thus, player A is going to claim a lot of consumption
in period 1; she perceives that she will receive very little consumption in the future
as player B will be very aggressive then.
However, player B has perceptions similar to player A and solve a similar problem,
yielding bB1 =
2200
3217
and aB1 =
792
3217
. Hence, in period 1, each players aims to consume
2200
3217
. However, these consumption plans are incompatible as they more than exhaust
the available stock of wealth. If we put as an additional restriction that the available
wealth is proportionally rationed if players want to claim more than what is available,
then the perception-perfect equilibrium becomes (a∗1, b
∗
1, a
∗
2, b
∗
2) =
(
1
2
, 1
2
, 0, 0
)
, i.e. all
consumption is done in period 1. Thus, these perceptions exacerbate the common
pool problem.
8 Two-player case: T periods
We now extend the two-person two-period model that we analyzed above, to a set-
ting with T periods, T > 2. This is conceptually straightforward, but notationally
tedious. We solve with backward induction. In period T, what the current player
A expects to be played is a game between herself and player B, with both players
having the type that she currently expects them to have. Moving back to period 1,
and given her perceptions concerning the players in period T − 1, she can then derive
her perceived equilibrium play in that period. Continuing in this manner yields a
perceived equilibrium in period 1, and hence a course of action for player A in period
1, with a similar analysis for player B.
12In period 2, player A perceives total consumption to be aA2 + b
A
2 = 10W2/11, hence in period 3
there is W2/11 left, which is equally shared among both players. Plugging in W2 = 1− aA1 − bA1 and
using 9 implies these expressions.
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To analyze this problem, we again need to make simplifying assumptions concern-
ing the perceptions of players. Not only do we need that A has to believe that she has
the same perceptions as B concerning future types, we also need that higher-order
perceptions are perceived to be equal. In other words we also need that the percep-
tions that A has in period l concerning the perceptions of B in period m concerning
the perceptions of A in period n, equal the perceptions that A thinks she herself has
in period l concerning herself in period n. Thus
Assumption 4 Future interplayer perception naivety. Perceptions of the oth-
erplayer are assumed identical to one’s own perceptions: µijlm(µ
jk
mn) = µ
ii
lm(µ
jk
mn) for
all i, j, k ∈ {A,B} .
Without this assumption, we would have to allow for the possibility that, at any
time in the future player A maintains the possibility that player B has different
perceptions concerning future types than she herself has. This possibility would force
player A to also form higher order beliefs concerning perceptions – a possibility that
would highly complicate the analysis. Together with the previous assumptions, future
interplayer perception naivety implies that all perceptions are always constant – and
are always assumed to be constant.
History at time t is now defined as Ht ≡ (a1, b1; . . . ; at−1, bt−1) . Lifetime utility at
time t ≤ T for player i can be written
U i1
(
a,b; βi
)
= ui1(a1, b1) + β
i
T∑
k=t+1
δkuik(Hk, ak, bk) + β
iδT+1uit+1(Ht+1)
U it
(
a,b; γi
)
= uit(Ht, at, bt) + γ
i
T∑
k=t+1
δkuik(Hk, ak, bk) + γ
AδT+1uAt+1(Ht+1)
∀1 < t ≤ T for i ∈ {A,B}, a =(a1, . . . , aT ) and b =(b1, . . . , bT ).
The analysis for T = 2 naturally extends to one with more periods. Consider
period T. In an equilibrium as perceived by player i, actions taken in the last period
will be mutual best responses given the perceptions player i has about the future type
of both players, and given the history of play up to period T . Again, we can write
player i’s perceptions about player j’s future type as µij, the only difference with the
analysis in Section 6 being that this now refers to perceptions about types in any
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future period, rather than just the next. Given perceived play in period T , player
i can then move back to period T − 1 and derive a perceived equilibrium for that
period. This process unravels until period 1, allowing us to write down the conditions
for a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium as perceived by player i. We will refer to this
simply as an equilibrium as perceived by player i.
Definition 8 In the T -period, 2-person game with time-inconsistent players, an equi-
librium at time τ as perceived by player i, given her perceptions µi and history Ht is
a sequence (aiτ , b
i
τ , a
i
τ+1, b
i
τ+1, . . . , a
i
T , b
i
T ) such that
1. For period T
aiT = arg max
aT∈AT (HT )
∑
γ∈{β,1}
µiA (γ)UAT
(
HT , aT , b
A
T ; γ
)
biT = arg max
bT∈BT (HT )
∑
γ∈{β,1}
µiB (γ)UBT
(
HT , a
A
T , bT ; γ
)
2. For periods t with τ < t < T
ait
(
Hτ+1;µ
A
)
= arg max
at∈At(Ht)
∑
γ∈{β,1}
µiA (γ)UAt
(
Ht, at, b
i
t, a
i
t+1
(
Ht+1;µ
A
)
,
bit+1
(
Ht+1;µ
A
)
, . . . , aiT (HT ;µ
A
), biT
(
HT ;µ
A
)
; γ
)
bit
(
Hτ+1;µ
A
)
= arg max
bt∈Bt(Ht)
∑
γ∈{β,1}
µiB (γ)UBt
(
Ht, a
i
t, bt, a
i
t+1
(
Ht+1;µ
A
)
,
bit+1
(
Ht+1;µ
A
)
, . . . , aiT (HT ;µ
A), biT
(
HT ;µ
A
)
; γ
)
3. For t = τ
aiτ = arg max
aτ∈Aτ (Hτ )
UAτ
(
Hτ , aτ , b
i
τ , a
i
τ+1
(
Hτ+1;µ
A
)
, biτ+1
(
Hτ+1;µ
A
)
,
. . . , aiT (HT ;µ
A), biT
(
HT ;µ
A
)
; β
)
biτ = arg max
bτ∈Bτ (Hτ )
UBτ
(
Hτ , a
i
τ , bτ , a
i
τ+1
(
Hτ+1;µ
A
)
, biτ+1
(
Hτ+1;µ
A
)
,
. . . , aiT (HT ;µ
A), biT
(
HT ;µ
A
)
; β
)
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Using these definitions, and considering play in period 1, we thus expect player A
to take an action that she perceives to be part of a subgame perfect equilibrium for
the entire game, while we expect player B to take an action that he perceives to be
part of a subgame perfect equilibrium for the entire game.
Definition 9 A perception-perfect equilibrium of the game is an outcome (a∗1, b
∗
1, a
∗
2, b
∗
2,
. . . , a∗T , b
∗
T ) such that ∀τ ∈ {1, . . . , T} a∗τ is part of an equilibrium at time τ as per-
ceived by player A; b∗τ is part of an equilibrium at time τ as perceived by player B.
Note again that players do not learn anything about the perceptions or type of
the other player upon observing her actions. Of course, we do allow a player to adapt
her strategy upon observing the other player’s action in a previous period. In other
words, we assume that, say, player A takes the action that she feels is part of an
equilibrium of the second stage based on the actions that she actually observed to be
played in period 1, rather than the actions that she expected to be played in period
1. Also, it is again straightforward to extend the analysis above to a case where, for
example, one player is known to be time-consistent, or to a case where players cannot
observe the other player’s current type.
9 Application to Sequential Bargaining
9.1 Rubinstein bargaining with time-consistent players
In this section, we apply our framework to a dynamic bargaining game as proposed by
Stahl (1972) and Rubinstein (1982).13 In a Rubinstein bargaining game, two players,
A and B, bargain over the division of a pie of size 1. There are T periods. In odd-
numbered periods (t = 1, 3, 5, . . .) player A proposes a sharing rule (xt, 1 − xt) that
player B can accept or reject. The first number in the sharing rule always represents
the share that A obtains, while the second number is the share that B obtains. If
player B accepts an offer, the game ends and the proposed division is implemented.
If B rejects, he makes a counteroffer in the next period that player A can accept
13As noted in the introduction, we are not the first to consider Rubinstein bargaining with possibly
naive hyperbolic discounters. Akin (2007) and Sarafidis (2006) derive comparable results by imposing
restrictions on possible types and without explicitly modeling systems of perceptions
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or reject. In this standard specification of the game, both players have the usual
time-consistent preferences. Suppose that player A uses discount factor δA, while
B uses δB. Hence if (x, 1 − x) is accepted at time t, the payoffs to the players are
(δtAx, δ
t
B (1− x)).
To fix ideas, we first consider the well-known solution to the standard model.
Consider the case that T is even. We look for a subgame perfect equilibrium. In
stage T , A will accept any proposal. Player B will thus offer (xT−1, 1− xT−1) = (0, 1).
Knowing this, in stage T − 1, player A claims the highest share that would still make
player B be willing to accept. Hence, she plays (xT−1, 1− xT−1) = (1− δB, δB). With
the same logic, in period T − 2, player B offers A the lowest share she is still willing
to accept, so (xT−2, 1− xT−2) = (δA (1− δB) , 1− δA (1− δB)) , etc. The equilibrium
then has player A making an offer in period 1 that is immediately accepted. In the
remainder, in a T -period game with T odd where it is common knowledge that A and
B use discount factors δA and δB respectively, we denote the equilibrium sharing rule
proposed in period t as (x∗t (δA, δB) , 1− x∗t (δA, δB)) .
9.2 Rubinstein bargaining with time-inconsistent players
Now consider our framework with hyperbolic and possibly naive discounters. Our
solution concept, perception-perfect equilibrium, requires that in each period each
player chooses the action that is part of a subgame-perfect equilibrium, given her
perceptions concerning the future types of both players. In a sequential move game
as we have here, this concept is relatively easy to implement.
Suppose that both players use the discount factor δ, but may differ in the extent to
which they are time-consistent. We first derive the equilibrium as perceived by player
A. She perceives the future player B to have type γAB ∈ {β, 1} and the future player
A to have type γAA ∈ {β, 1} . In other words, she perceives the future player B to use
discount factor γABδ, and the future player A to use discount factor γAAδ. Importantly,
she also perceives all other players, present and future, to have those same perceptions.
In stage T, player A will accept anything. Player B will thus offer (xT , 1− xT ) =
(0, 1). Knowing this, in stage T − 1, player A claims the highest share she perceives
she can get and that would still make player B be willing to accept. Hence, she plays
(xT−1, 1− xT−1) = (1−γABδ, γABδ). For period T −2, player A perceives player B to
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have the same perceptions concerning how play will continue in T−1. Hence, in period
T − 2, the current player A perceives B to offer A the lowest share she is still willing
to accept, so (xT−2, 1− xT−2) =
(
γAAδ
(
1− γABδB
)
, 1− γAAδ (1− γABδ)) . Hence,
player A perceives future selves to act as if player A’s true discount factor is γAAδ,
while player B’s true discount factor is γABδ. Thus, the equilibrium as perceived by
player A is
(
x∗t
(
γAAδ, γABδ
)
, 1− x∗t
(
γAAδ, γABδ
))
, for all t ∈ {1, . . . T}. Similarly,
the equilibrium as perceived by player B is
(
x∗t
(
γBAδ, γABδ
)
, 1− x∗t
(
γAAδ, γABδ
))
for all t ∈ {1, . . . T}.14
9.3 Infinite horizon
To derive some qualitative predictions, we look at the case with an infinite horizon.
From the literature on Rubinstein bargaining, we know the following. Suppose that
players are time-consistent and have discount factors δA and δB. In a period where
it is player A’s turn to make an offer, the unique equilibrium then has equilibrium
payoff to player A that equal
piA(A moves first) =
1− δB
1− δAδB .
If it is player B’s turn to make an offer, the equilibrium payoff to player A is
piA(B moves first) =
δA (1− δB)
1− δAδB .
Of course, expressions for piB are similar. A straightforward proof can be found in
Shaked and Sutton (1984) or Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), chapter 4.
Now consider our model with possibly time-inconsistent players. Again consider
the equilibrium as perceived by player A. For the finite-horizon case, we saw that that
equilibrium is equivalent to one with time-consistent players where δA = γ
AAδ and
δB = γ
ABδ. It is straightforward to see that that also applies to the infinite horizon
case.15 Thus, for any future period where A moves first, i ∈ {A,B} perceives the
14Note that we also need that player A prefers her current offer above what she will get from B
in the future, properly discounted. It is easy to show, however, that that is always satisfied.
15The proof is identical to that in Shaked and Sutton (1984) or Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), but
using discount factors γAAδ and γABδ rather that δA and δB . Hence, we do not repeat it here.
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continuation payoffs of player A to be
piiA(A moves first) =
1− γiAδ
1− γiAγiBδ2 .
and those of player B
piiB(A moves first) =
γiA
(
1− γiB)
1− γiAγiB
More generally, for any future period where j moves first, i perceives the contin-
uation payoffs of player k to be
piik(j moves first) =
{
1−γimδ
1−γiAγ 6iBδ2 j = k,m 6= j
γikδ(1−γijδ)
1−γiAγ 6iBδ2 j 6= k
for i, j, k,m ∈ {A,B} .
Note however that these expressions apply to any future period. When one player
makes an offer to another player in the current time period, she will not base that
offer on the perceived future type of that player, but rather on the current type. By
assumption, she can observe the true current type βB of the other player. If player
A makes an offer in period 1, she will thus offer B the lowest amount he is willing to
accept, given that if B can make a counteroffer in the next period, B’s continuation
payoff will be
(
1− γAAδ) / (1− γAAγABδ2) . Thus, A will offer
1− xt
(
γAA, γAB
)
=
βBδ
(
1− γAAδ)
1− γAAγABδ2 . (10)
A similar analysis holds if it is player B’s turn to move.
Yet, player A’s offer will not always be accepted. If it is not, there will be delay
in bargaining. Consider period 1. Player B perceives his continuation payoff in that
period to be
piBB(B moves first) =
1− γBAδ
1− γBAγBBδ2 .
He will thus reject A’s offer (10) if he perceives it to give him a lower net present
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value than holding out and making a counteroffer in the next period, thus if
βBδ
(
1− γAAδ)
1− γAAγABδ2 <
βBδ
(
1− γBAδ)
1− γBAγBBδ2 .
We thus have:
Theorem 1 In the perception-perfect equilibrium of the Rubinstein bargaining game
with possibly naive hyperbolic discounters, in period t, player i will make an offer
βjδ (1− γiiδ)
1− γiAγiBδ2
to player j, i ∈ {A,B} , j 6= i . Player j will accept if and only if
1− γiiδ
1− γiAγiBδ2 ≥
1− γjiδ
1− γjAγjBδ2 (11)
Note that this expression does not directly depend on β. Thus, if we only have
hyperbolic discounting, but no naivety, there will never be a delay in reaching an
agreement. More generally, if A and B share the same perceptions (thus γAA = γBA
and γBA = γBB) the left- and right-hand side of (11) are equal and there is no
delay. This is natural: in the equilibrium of this game, any player offers to the
other player what she perceives the other player is just willing to accept. As long as
those perceptions are shared we get the same qualitative outcome as in the standard
Rubinstein model, in the sense that the first offer will be immediately accepted.
9.4 Bargaining breakdown
Above, we derived condition (11) for a delay in bargaining to occur.16 Note that this
immediately implies
Corollary 2 In the Rubinstein bargaining model with hyperbolic, possible naive dis-
counters, negotiations break down in the sense that an agreement is never reached
16For more reasons why there may be delay in Rubinstein bargaining, see e.g. Yildiz (2004), and
the references therein.
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whenever the following conditions hold:
1− γAAδ
1− γAAγABδ2 <
1− γBAδ
1− γBAγBBδ2 (12)
1− γBBδ
1− γBAγBBδ2 <
1− γABδ
1− γAAγABδ2 . (13)
This result allows us to easily derive whether negotiations will break down in var-
ious scenarios. Consider for example the case in which both players are sophisticated
about the other player, but naive about themselves. Thus, assume γAB = γBA = β
and γAA = γBB = 1. In that case, the denominators of both (12) and (13) are equal,
and both conditions simplify to 1 − δ < 1 − βδ, which is always satisfied. Hence,
bargaining breaks down and the two parties never reach an agreement.
The intuition is as follows. If player A makes an offer to player B, she perceives
the future B to be time inconsistent. Hence, her offer will be relatively low, as she
perceives B to be very impatient. Player B however, perceives his future self to be
patient. Therefore, he will not accept the current offer of player A, as he perceives to
be able to do better. The same is true in the opposite case where player B makes an
offer to A. Hence, players keep rejecting each others’ offers and an agreement is never
reached. Qualitatively, we thus get a similar result to that in the case of the common
pool problem discussed earlier. Also there, the game broke down if players correctly
anticipated their competitor’s time inconsistency but were naive about their own.
Now suppose that each player is sophisticated about her own time inconsistency,
but naive about the other player, so γAB = γBA = 1 and γAA = γBB = β. The
conditions then simplify to 1−βδ < 1−δ, which is never satisfied. Players immediately
reach an agreement, like they do in the standard model. Now, player A perceives a
future B to be more patient that B himself perceives his future self to be. Hence, the
offer of A is actually better than B was expecting to get, and he will gladly accept.
When players differ in their naivety, the outcome depends on who moves first.
Consider a case in which player A is naive about both players, while B is sophisticated
about both. Hence γAA = γAB = 1 and γBA = γBB = β. Conditions (12) and (13)
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then simplify to
1− δ
1− δ2 <
1− βδ
1− βδ2
1− βδ
1− β2δ2 <
1− δ
1− δ2
It is easy to see that the first condition is always satisfied, while the second never
is. We thus get some delay in bargaining: player B rejects the offer of player A,
but player A accepts the counteroffer. When A moves first, B accepts immediately,
perceiving the offer of A as overwhelmingly generous.
10 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a solution concept, perception-perfect equilibrium, for
games played between hyperbolic discounters that are possibly naive about their
own future time inconsistency, and/or the time inconsistency of their competitor. A
perception-perfect equilibrium essentially requires each player in each period to play
an action that is consistent with subgame perfection, given the perception of that
player concerning the time consistency of each player, and under the assumption that
all other present and future players have the same perceptions.
We applied our solution concept to the common pool problem and to Rubinstein
bargaining. In both cases, we showed that, if we assume that players are sophisti-
cated about their competitor’s future time inconsistency but naive about their own,
the perfection-perfect equilibria of those games are disastrous. The common pool is
exhausted even more quickly than with standard, rational players, and even more
quickly than with time-inconsistent but sophisticated players. Bargaining in the Ru-
binstein model breaks down completely, as each offer is rejected.
Of course, our approach is just the first step in the analysis of such games. There
is much room for further analysis. For example, our perception-perfect equilibrium
requires that players are strategically naive, in the sense that they do not take into
account the possibility that other players may have different perceptions. Also, they
do not learn from past behavior of other players. If offers in a bargaining game are
rejected repeatedly, for example, one may expect players to take that into account
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and choose a somewhat different strategy when making further offers. Also, a highly
sophisticated player may take advantage of her knowledge concerning the naivety of
the other player to gain a strategic advantage.
Still, our framework is highly flexible and easily allows for extensions and mod-
ifications. For example, it is easy to allow for cases in which players are partially
naive and realize their future time inconsistency to some limited extent. Also, it is
straightforward to extend our perception-perfect equilibrium to a case with more than
two types, or with more than two players. Our framework may even be applied to
other (mis)perceptions and behavioral biases to which players are possibly unaware.
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